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ABORTION ON DEMAND IN A POST-WADE CONTEXT:
MUST THE STATE PAY THE BILLS?
The subject of abortions .. . is one of the most inflammatory ones to reach
the [Supreme] Court. People instantly take sides and the public . . . makes
up its mind one way or the other before the case is even argued.'
[The subject] involves the most basik and volatile principles about which
men can differ: life, death, liberty, privacy, our traditions, our ideals, our
moral values.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Early in his technological quest to master his environment, man learned how
to terminate the biological process of procreation. Society reacted in various
ways to this development, in moral, philosophical and legal terms. Thus, for
example, during the Persian Empire, criminal abortions were severely punished,
while the Greeks and the Romans were apparently far more tolerant of the
practice.3 Academicians and moral philosophers continued to debate the issues
surrounding the abortion decision down through the years 4 and, more recently,
American courtrooms became the forum as the legal profession sought to deter-
mine the lawfulness of so-called restrictive abortion statutes that began to
flourish in the nineteenth century.6 These cases produced uncommonly con-
flicting results,7 and stoked a heated public debate8 Ultimately, in January,
1973, the Supreme Court met the issues head-on in the landmark cases of
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton.10 The Court held the restrictive statutes of
1. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 79-80 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 324, 329
N.Y.S.2d 722, 729 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972),
noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 439 (1972).
3. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 715 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality? 46 Notre Dame Law. S
(1970); Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 3S
S. Cal. L. Rev. 123 (1962); Comment, Abortion Law Reform in New York: A Study of
Religious, Moral, Medical and Legal Conflict, 31 Albany L. Rev. 290 (1967); sources col-
lected in Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 715-18 (1973).
5. "Restrictive" abortion laws are to be distinguished from "liberalized" abortion laws
which allow "elective" abortions. The usual formulation of a "restrictive" statute allows
abortions necessary to save the mother's life or to protect her health. See 41 Fordham L. Rev.
439 n.3 (1972).
6. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 715 (1973).
7. See cases collected in Roe v. Wade, 93 S. CL 705, 727-28 (1973).
8. A Gallup Poll conducted just prior to the Court's decisions in Wade and Bolton found
that 46% of those questioned favored leaving the abortion decision to the woman and her
physician during the first three months of pregnancy, while 45% opposed that idea. Time,
Feb. 5, 1973, at 51, col 3. The debate even reached the level of presidential politics, becoming
a minor issue in the 1972 election. See N.Y. Times, Sept 25, 1972, at 42, col 2; N.Y.
Times, May 7, 1972, § 1, at 1, col 2.
9. 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
10. 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
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Texas and Georgia unconstitutional as violative of the fourteenth amendment.'
In the Wade decision, the seven-to-two majority held that prior to the end of
the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision was to be left to the
woman and her physician; that during the time approximating the second
trimester, the state could regulate the abortion procedure, and that after
"viability" of the fetus, the state could regulate, or even proscribe, abortion,
except where it was necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or
health.' 2 In Bolton, the Court held certain procedures restricting the avail-
ability of abortions unconstitutional,' 3 thereby establishing some guidelines
for state legislatures faced with the task of redrafting their abortion statutes
to conform to the Court's decisions.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the Court's decisions, particularly
that in the Wade case, 14 so as to ascertain the nature of the right recognized
therein. Thereafter, the Comment will analyze the question whether a pregnant
woman has a right to abortion on demand, 1 even if she is without the pecuniary
means to do so. 16 In this respect, the approach will be to look at possible
constitutional arguments and then at statutory grounds.
11. Id. at 752; 93 S. Ct. at 732.
12. 93 S. Ct. at 732. Several state attorneys general have indicated they consider the
Wade and Bolton decisions as limited to the statutes presented to the Court and that,
therefore, their restrictive abortion laws remain in effect until specifically declared unconsti-
tutional. See note 80 infra. However, the Court underscored its decisions by vacating and
remanding nine cases involving challenged abortion statutes. 41 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Feb. 26,
1973); see 169 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1973, at 1, col. 6. At the same time, the Court dsmissed
the appeal of the case in which the liberalized New York statute had been upheld by state
courts for lack of a substantial federal question. See 169 N.Y.LJ., Feb. 27, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
For the time being, at least, the Court seems to have laid the issue to rest in its denial of
a rehearing to the Connecticut case in which petitioners sought to raise new medical evidence.
See Markle v. Abele, 41 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Apr. 16, 1973).
In the meantime, anti-abortion forces caught off-guard by the Court's decisions have
launched efforts to mute the Court's rulings, including efforts to amend the Constitution to
extend rights to the fetus. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 4. For a cursory review of
legislative developments in the wake of the Court's actions, see id. at 46, cols. 1-3.
13. 93 S. Ct. at 752 (invalidating provisions requiring that the hospital be accredited by
a special commission, that a hospital abortion committee approve the abortion decision, that
there be confirmation by two independent physicians and that the patient be a Georgia
resident).
14. The Wade case is emphasized because that decision contained the bulk of the Court's
analysis as to the rights involved in the abortion decision. See Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. at
746.
15. During this discussion, the term "abortion on demand" will be used as a shorthand
for the indigent woman's goal; viz., to obtain an abortion without payment of a fee. It
should not be confused with that use of the term by some commentators during the pre-
Wade era in reference to what more aptly is called "elective" abortion. For an example of
the latter use see Byrn, supra note 4.
16. Having defined the parameters of the instant discussion, some mention of the sig-
nificant issues in the law of abortion which remain unanswered in the wake of the Wade
and Bolton cases-and which are beyond the scope of this anaysis-is in order. Primary
[Vol. 41
ABORTION ON DEMAND
II. THE NATuRx O THE Wade RIGHT
In analyzing whether an indigent, pregnant woman in the post-Wade context
has a right to an abortion at public expense, determination of the "right"
enunciated in Wade is essential. A careful perusal of the opinion yields at least
three formulations of that "right."
A. The Right To Decide To Terminate
The first of these possible interpretations---and perhaps the dominant one-
is that a woman has a fundamental right to decide to terminate her pregnancy.
The majority opinion stated that prior decisions of the Court "make it clear
that only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' .. . are included in [the] guarantee of personal
privacy."'17 The Court then continued:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District
Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.' 8
among these questions is that of whether the woman has the right to decide to terminate
her pregnancy against the will of her husband (or the putative father). The converse of this
situation also presents thorny issues for future litigation. A third area involves the question
of whether a minor child needs parental consent for an abortion. Still another situation on
which the Court has yet to shed light is whether a nurse or other medical professional has
vested job (property) rights such that she might challenge successfully transfer from a
medical station if her superiors threatened such a move following her principled refusal to
take part in an abortion. In this regard New York's Code of Rules and Regulations stipu-
lates that: "No physician or other person shall be required to perform or participate in a
medical or surgical procedure which may result in the termination of a pregnancy." 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 505.2 (e) (3) (ii) (1971). A recent Senate bill would allow physicians and other
medical workers to refuse to perform abortions or sterilzations if their religious beliefs or
moral convictions opposed such procedures. See N.Y. Post, Mar. 28, 1973, at 16, col. 1. See
also 119 Cong. Rec. S 5717-41 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1973). Nor did the Court's opinion in
Wade indicate whether government funds might be curtailed if the hospital or clinic de-
dined to perform an abortion. Compare the Senate bill discussed in N.Y. Post, Mar. 28,
1973, at 16, col. 1, with the regulation discussed at note 155 infra. Finally, the Court's
decisions do not resolve whether a woman with limited access to medical care has a right
to an abortion if the physician or facilities available to her refuse to abort her. While the
Court emphasized the doctor's role in the abortion decision, 93 S. Ct. at 732-33, at least
one pre-Wade court ordered the state of Wyoming not only to provide Medicaid funds for
an abortion, but also to finance the woman's trip to New York so she could obtain an
abortion under New York's liberalized law. Letter from H. J. Arnieri, Law Clerk of the
Attorney General of Wyoming to the Fordham Law Review, Mar. 16, 1973, on file Fordham
Law Review Library.
17. 93 S. Ct. at 726 (citation omitted).
18. Id. at 727 (emphasis added). After explaining its holding that the right is not abso-
lute, but subject to state regulation so as to safeguard health, maintain medical standards
and protect potential life, the Court added: "We therefore conclude that the right of per-
1973]
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B. The Right To Terminate
A second possible reading of the Court's enunciated "right," however, may
be gleaned from the subsequent paragraph; namely, that a woman has a right
to terminate her pregnancy. The Court entertained the contention of some
amici that "the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate
her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reasons
she alone chooses."'1 9 While the Court rejected the half of the argument that
the right was absolute, finding instead that restrictions as to medical standards
and safeguards were proper,20 it did not reject the formulation of the right as
that to terminate the pregnancy.
C. The Two-Party Decisional Right
A third interpretation of the "right" at issue emerges from the Court's asser-
tion that, before the end of the first trimester, the woman and her doctor should
be free from state restrictions. In this analysis, the Court stated:
This means ... that ... the attending physician, in consultation with his patient,
is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that in his medical judgment the
patient's pregnancy should be terminated. 21
This language would indicate that while the woman may have some form (or
fraction) of a fundamental right to decide to terminate her pregnancy, unless
she can find a physician who will concur in her decision, the "right" involved
in the abortion decision is incomplete because it is incapable of effectuation.
While the Court buttresses this interpretation with the statement that "the
abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical
decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician," 22 the
position is illogical. If the abortion "right"-however difficult its precise
articulation may be-is to derive from the right of personal privacy,2 3 how
can it be conditioned upon the concurrence of a physician?
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Wade reflect the vagueness of the
Court's formulation of the "right" by their articulation of diverse views as to
whether abortion on demand is encompassed by the opinion of the Court. Chief
Justice Burger, concurring, stated unequivocally: "Plainly, the Court today
rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortion on demand.12 4 The
sonal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must
be considered against important state interests in regulation." Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 732.
22. Id. at 733 (emphasis added). See also id. at 732, where the Court stated: "(a) For
the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and Its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physl-
clan."
23. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
24. 93 S. Ct. at 756 (concurring opinion).
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language of the Court which one might construe as most directly supporting
the Chief Justice's conclusion appeared in the Bolton case, where it was stated:
"Roe v. Wade, ante, sets forth our conclusion that a pregnant woman does not
have an absolute constitutional right to an abortion on her demand." -5 The
wording, certainly, is straightforward and may indeed be used in subsequent
litigation to deny indigents the abortions they demand. However, the context
of the Bolton language is equally dear, for the following sentence of that
opinion read: "What is said there is applicable here and need not be repeated,""
and what the Court had said in Wade on this point was that the state could
restrict the factors that govern the abortion decision so as to affect medical
standards and medical safeguards and to protect potential life.2 7 Thus, given
the context, reliance on the Bolton statement for the proposition that abortion
on demand is not constitutionally mandated seems unwarranted.m
Justice White, apparently taking a view of the Court's opinion diametrically
opposed to the Chief Justice's, dissented in an opinion in which Justice
Rehnquist joined, stating: "The Court for the most part sustains this position:
.. the Constitution, therefore, guarantees the right to an abortion as against
any state law or policy seeking to protect the fetus from an abortion not
prompted by more compelling reasons of the mother. '"- Finally, Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion reinforced the contention that the proper formula-
tion of the Court-held right is that of the right to decide to terminate a
pregnancy. Justice Stewart cited the broad language in the Court's 1972 decision
of Eisenstadt v. Baird30 that the right of privacy included "the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child." 31 From that proposition, he concluded that "[t]hat
right necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." 32
In the wake of the Wade decision, one may say the basis of the ruling
ostensibly was that the constitutionally recognized right to personal privacy
25. Id. at 746.
26. Id.
27. 93 S. Ct. at 727; note 18 supra; text accompanying note 19 supra.
28. At this juncture, it should be noted that Justice Burger's statement may reflect what
the Court intended to say. Off-the-record reports indicate that the Chief Justice was in the
minority when the justices voted on the case after initial argument during the 1971 term.
However, after Justices Powell and Rehnquist were seated, reargument held, and the ma-
jority opinion reworked, Burger apparently was wooed to the majority. Time, Feb. 5,
1973, at 51. Thus, the Chief Justice's statement arguably could be taken as a reflection of
how Justice Blackmun, the author of the opinion, explained the majority's position. How-
ever, the law is what the justices say it is and not what they may have intended to say it
is, until, of course, they have an opportunity to clarify what was said.
29. 93 S. Ct. at 763 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
30. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
31. Id. at 453.
32. 93 S. Ct. at 735 (Stewart, 3., concurring).
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included the abortion decision-a fundamental, albeit not an absolute, right.
However, the precise nature of the right-and even the person in whom it
resides-seems uncertain. These definitional matters are areas for future Court
clarification. Therefore, the focus here now shifts to the alternative considera-
tions available to the lower courts which may be called upon to interpret the
Court's mandates in dealing with an indigent woman's demand for an abortion.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ABSOLUTE
A. Established Arguments
From a litigator's point of view, the most enticing argument-the one by
which, if successful, he would win the most for his indigent client-is fle
absolutist constitutional approach.3 3 However, several constitutional arguments
are unavailable.
Most notable among this group is the fashionable equal protection clause, for
which the critical state action element is lacking. It has been argued 4 that, by
licensing all physicians who may perform abortions,"3 state action comes into
play. However, the Court has stated that not all state involvement constitutes
state action sufficient to trigger the due process and equal protection analyses.3 0
Moreover, as regards the equal protection analysis, when an indigent pregnant
woman seeks an abortion, it is the doctor, not the state, that creates the money
hurdle which prevents her from terminating her pregnancy.
The line of cases of which Griffin v. Illinois8 7 is the primogenitor, and which
extended certain rights to criminal defendants, notwithstanding their inability
33. For an analysis of the identical problem-whether the indigent has a constitutional
claim for a free abortion--debarking from the same premise, but reaching a contrary con-
clusion to this Comment, see 36 Albany L. Rev. 794, 797-803 (1972).
34. Id. at 798.
35. The Wade Court stated that states could require that all those performing abortions
were licensed physicians. 93 S. Ct. at 732-33.
36. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972), noted in 41 Fordham L.
Rev. 695 (1973), where the Court said: "The Court has never held, of course, that discrimina-
tion by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the
private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is sub-
ject to state regulation in any degree whatever. . . . Our holdings indicate that where the
impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have 'significantly involved itself
with invidious discriminations,' . . . in order for the discriminatory action to fall within
the ambit of the constitutional prohibition."
The instant discussion, of course, does not exhaust the universe of possible state involve-
ments. Consideration of situations where hospitals are state-operated or heavily subsidized,
and of cases where the physician's income may be derived largely from one form or another
of state grant, is omitted. Such gradations of the state action question are beyond the scope
of the immediate discussion. It is submitted that such problems should be resolved on a
case-by-case basis. But see text accompanying notes 69-153 infra. For a discussion of the
state action question where Hill-Burton funds are involved see Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp.,
Civil No. 72-1611 (10th Cir., filed Apr. 4, 1973).
37. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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to pay for transcripts or court fees,38 is also inapposite. Three elements were
crucial to the due process and equal protection analysis of Griffin: (1) a state-
created "money hurdle" 39 which impeded (2) judicial access for a (3) criminal
defendant. None of the elements is present in the post-Wade context under
discussion.
Yet another group of cases to be distinguished from the instant hypothetical
is that commencing with Boddie v. Connecticut."0 There, the Court held that
a state could not bar indigents from divorce court solely because they could
not afford the required court costs. In a narrowly drawn,41 due process2 opinion,
the Court emphasized the primacy the marital relationship enjoys in
society43 and the state's monopolization of the process for liberation "from the
constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage."44 Recently, the Burger
Court has underscored the narrowness of Boddie. In United States v. Kras,4"
the Court refused to extend the Boddie rule to bankruptcy filing fees. The
five-man4 6 majority emphasized that there were alternative means of a
debtor's adjusting his legal relationships with his creditors47 (no state monopoli-
zation), and that the right to file bankruptcy was not a fundamental constitu-
tional one.48 More recently, when presented with a challenge to the imposition
of a $25 court fee as a prerequisite to appeals in all civil cases, the Court
ruled that Kras, rather than Boddie, governed.49
38. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 US. 738 (1967) (requiring court-appointed coun-
sel to provide the indigent with effective advocacy on appeal); Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487 (1963) (reversing a state court's determination that an appeal was frivolous for
want of a sufficient record on which to base such a decision) ; Lane v. Brown, 372 US. 477
(1963) (invalidating procedure whereby criminal defendant was denied writ of coram nobis
because of indigency); Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353 (1963) (invalidating state court's
ex parte determination that indigent defendant's appeal was not so substantial as to require
appointment of counsel); Burns v. Ohio, 360 US. 252 (1959) (invalidating state require-
ment that indigent criminal defendant pay a fee preliminary to motion for leave to appeal
to higher court). These cases indicate that the Court has adopted a liberal interpretation
of what constitutes a "money hurdle;" that is, it may consist not only of a fee, but also
of an obstacle resulting from the indigent's inability to secure something, such as a record,
by which to perfect his appeal or motion.
39. The term is Justice Frankfurter's. See 351 US. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
41. See United States v. Kas, 93 S. Ct. 631, 640 (1973) ; 401 U.S. at 383-84.
42. 401 U.S. at 378. Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan concurred separately, seeking
to place the decision on equal protection grounds. See id. at 386 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring).
43. 401 U.S. at 376.
44. Id.
45. 93 S. Ct. 631 (1973).
46. Justice Blackmun authored the opinion in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
White, Powell and Rehnquist joined. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall dis-
sented. Id.
47. 93 S. Ct. at 638.
48. Id.
49. Ortwein v. Schwab, 93 S. Ct. 1172 (1973).
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The rule to be derived from these three cases, then, would seem to be that
in order for a civil litigant to succeed in an action to require the waiver of a
money hurdle there must be: (1) state monopolization of the means to adjust
(2) a constitutionally recognized fundamental interest, on which process (3)
the state imposes a monetary hurdle.60
B. The Right to Implementation
Having negated these handy constitutional arguments, one is left with what
may be called a "right to implementation." Simply stated, the proposi-
tion is: if a right is constitutionally recognized, the law will imply a corollary
right of implementation of the primary constitutional right. Relative to the
instant discussion, one lower New York court asserted the formula thusly:
Since the right to decide not to have a child has been held to be a fundamental one
... the State has an obligation to provide the indigent with adequate means to exercise
that right.51
The court used as a springboard from which to reach its conclusion the landmark
Supreme Court case of Gideon v. Wainwright.52 Unfortunately, Gideon may be
distinguished. First, it was a due process case." Secondly, it resulted in the
imposition of a positive burden only on the legal profession.54 Consequently,
50. Were the Court to find sufficient state involvement in the medical care delivery system
to trigger state action, cf. note 36 supra, then, conceivably the denial of an abortion to an
indigent woman would fit more appropriately into the Boddie classification than into a Kras
or Ortwein posture. Not only has the Court declared the abortion right to be within the
right of personal privacy and therefore fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, but it might well be urged that through licensing the eligible abortionists the state
monopolizes the availability of the procedure. Certainly, absent a natural miscarriage or the
use of an unsafe back-alley specialist, at present there is no alternative means to abort a
fetus that is currently available to the indigent. It may be, however, that with technological
developments such as the "morning after" pill (see N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1973, at 1, cols. 1-2),
and the menstrual extraction procedure (see N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1973, at 29, cois. 2-5),
alternative methods would become available at some time in the future.
51. City of New York v. Wyman, 66 Misc. 2d 402, 414, 321 N.Y.S.2d 695, 707 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd on other grounds mem., 37 App. Div. 2d 700, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1st Dep't 1971), rev'd
mem., 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972). While the argument has
been made for a "right of implementation," it has not met with much success. The appellate
division, in its affirmance on grounds of statutory and legislative intent, stated: "[TJli
resolution of the controversy herein does not directly involve any constitutional problem."
37 App. Div. 2d at 700, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 958. The discussion following, therefore, is an analysis
of why there was no constitutional problem.
52. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
53. Id. at 341.
54. The Court last term extended Gideon to all situations where a defendant faced possi-
ble incarceration. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 722
(1973). The Court noted therein that it felt the estimated 355,200 American attorneys could
handle the challenge of even the expanded Argersinger right to counsel. By contrast, the
shortage of medical personnel is at least in part the reason for the spiraling cost of medical
care.
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on the absolutist plane, reliance on Gideon for the purposes at hand may be
misplaced.
1. Treatment Accorded Other Fundamental Rights
The question remains, however, whether the right of implementation should
be accorded to indigent pregnant women. There is one major policy considera-
tion to be placed in juxtaposition to the assertion that the right should be
recognized. That is, that even in areas where the Court has recognized rights
as being of fundamental stature, or as being part of the right of personal
privacy and therefore either fundamental in themselves or implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, absent a due process or equal protection argument
relating to one of the judicial rights discussed above, the Court has not
accorded indigents a corollary right to satisfaction of the primary right'0
Among such fundamental rights are those to move freely among the states,r0
to enjoy marital privacy including the use of contraceptives,. T to raise and edu-
cate children,58 and to possess, in the privacy of one's home, obscene materials. 0
Why has the Court not accorded corollary implementation rights to these
primary fundamental rights? The short answer is that the issues may not have
been litigated. The better answer, however, is that such a course of action
would involve the judiciary in largely legislative functions, for there is no
clear constitutional mandate that all rights be accorded satisfaction. Further-
more, such a deviation from previously travelled paths would launch this
democracy a long way down the road towards a new socialized society, for it
would require not the waiver of a monetary hurdle, but the imposition of a
positive duty on the state. It may be useful to consider several possibilities.
For example, it may well be that a legislature might determine that planned
parenthood through systematic use of contraceptives was a desirable means to
achieve a stability of population and available resources. But it was the
legislature, not the courts, that determined that those desiring but too poor
to pay for birth control devices should receive them free.G0
Assisting poor parents to raise and educate their children in certain fashions
might be considered by some a worthwhile objective. But the Constitution's
55. Some of these fundamental rights are inapposite to the instant discussion, for they
are self-fufilling once recognized. E.g., the right to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1,
12 (1966); the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williams, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942). The right to vote is another, of which it need only be added that the Court has
held that states may not infringe on the right by imposition of a polling tax, e.g., Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-68 (1966).
56. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757 (1966).
57. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 485 (1965) ; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US.
438, 453 (1972).
58. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Mleyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
59. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
60. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a to a-6 (1970) (Family Planning Services and Research Act).
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free exercise and establishment clauses specifically interdict (and the equal
protection clause does so more generally) such a possibility.
It might be argued that free movement among the states would mollify some
of society's malaise by making the nation's natural beauty available to all and
tend perhaps to add to the mobility of an already mobile society. But would
not the providing of free transportation to indigents subvert one of the basic
underpinnings of the nation-the free enterprise system with its built-in
incentive mechanisms?
It may be that the first amendment requires that citizens be free to possess
obscene materials.6 1 It would hardly seem to follow, however, that a court should
accord a corollary right to indigents to obtain obscene materials free.
2. The Abortion Right: A Special Case?
The question of whether the abortion right, as encompassed in the funda-
mental right of personal privacy, should be extended to require that states
provide poor people with free abortions,02 is susceptible to similar analysis.
Furthermore, if such a right were accorded, would the constitutional prohibi-
tion against the deprivation of life without due process then require states to
provide all indigents with full medical care? An affirmative reply seems pre-
posterous,6 3 for it would place an enormous financial burden on the states at
a time when medical costs are extremely high and physicians in short supply.
Moreover, Congress has implicitly recognized that the problem is one of statu-
tory dimensions, rather than constitutional, by attempting to deal with part of
the problem by drafting legislation to provide national health insurance. 1
On the other hand, at least one court has stated: "It is legally proper and
indeed imperative that uniform medical abortion services be provided all segments
of the population, the poor as well as the rich."0 5 Moreover, when the issue is
whether an abortion should be performed, there are special detrimental effects
-which the Court has recognized-which the society may so wish to avoid that
recognition of the corollary right to a free abortion may be legally proper.
Among these feared possibilities are: that the potential mother suffer direct
61. The Court has held that the Stanley right does not extend to protecting the importer
of obscene materials from a criminal charge. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
402 U.S. 363 (1971). But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969), where the Court
speaks of a "right to receive."
62. Even should the Court grant a right of implementation as a corollary to the right
recognized in Wade, only in one case would the poor thereby be able to obtain free abortions;
namely, if the "right" in Wade was the right to terminate. If the right to be derived from
Wade is either the two-party or the woman's decisional right, implementation of that right
would not help the indigent woman to the operating room.
63. Yet, at least Chief Justice Burger seems to have considered extending the list of
fundamental rights to include that of public health. See 41 U.S.L.W. 3197 (U.S. Oct. 17,
1972) (report of oral argument on school financing cases). The context of his remarks,
however, suggests his non-acceptance of such a proposition.
64. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1972, at 48, col. 2.
65. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969) (dictum), rev'd, 402
U.S. 62 (1971) (deciding only that criminal abortion statute was not void for vagueness).
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medical harm; that as a result of her maternity or of her bearing additional
offspring the mother have a distressful life and future; that she incur mental
illness or psychological harm; that the unwanted child suffer mentally or
physically while being reared in a hostile environment, and that the mother or
child suffer the impact of the continuing stigma attached to unwed mother-
hood.66 All of these factors should weigh heavily on a court faced with the
problem; they might even prove determinative.
That the present Court might accord the corollary right to a free abortion
seems unlikely, especially in light of the Court's recent reluctance to add to the
list of recognized fundamental rights.6 7 However, if after weighing the com-
peting interests the Court should mandate observance of such an additional
right, its rule should be limited to the abortion question. The Court should be
cognizant that such steps are usually better left to the legislature;6 aware
that few constitutional rights have been interpreted as spawning corollary
rights of implementation, and, most importantly, honest in assessing its role
and admitting that its course of action, while it may be preferable for moral or
policy reasons, is not constitutionally mandated.
IV. ENTnR MicAm
A. Background
Congress enacted title XIX of the Social Security Act-commonly called
Medicaid-in 1965,69 thereby making available to states federal funds to help
meet the costs of providing medical assistance to certain qualified groups of poor
people.Y0 The Medicaid provisions were "almost overlooked," 7' according to one
commentator, because of the publicity attendant the passage of enlarged
Medicare (assistance to the elderly) grants in the same legislation, but have
since had a major impact.72
The purpose of the Medicaid statute is ascertainable from its face as well as
from the legislative history leading to its passage. The statute begins:
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the conditions
in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent
66. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
67. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 12
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; see San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973) (holding that for equal protection purposes, only those rights
implicitly or explicitly incorporated in the constitution may be deemed fundamental).
68. See Gunther 3-4, discussing the "error" of the Warren Court in making inadequately
reasoned pronouncements. See also sources cited at id. n.13.
69. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396d (1970), as amended, 42 US.C.A. §§ 1396-1396d (Supp. 1973).
70. See text accompanying note 82 infra.
71. Werne, Medicaid: Has National Health Insurance Entered by the Back Door?, 18
Syracuse L. Rev. 49 (1966).
72. See 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1077, 1078, estimating an expenditure
of $12 billion during fiscal 1970 for Medicare and Medicaid programs.
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children and of aged, blind, or permanently and totally disabled individuals, whose
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and
(2) rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals attain or
retain capability for independence or self-care [funds may be appropriated] .... 'a
Until recently, the Act, and the regulations issued pursuant to it, asserted that
a goal of the statute was the broadening of the scope of medical and remedial
care and services made available through it to the end that comprehensive medi-
cal and remedial care and services be furnished all eligible individuals. 4 The
target date for this full assistance to medical indigents was originally 1975. 75
As the cost of medical care skyrocketed in the late 1960's, Congress pushed the
date back two years; 76 then, on October 30, 1972, the lawmakers repealed that
section of the Act which mandated that states continually broaden their pro-
grams.77 However, Congress has yet to abandon its original goals, for as late
as the 1972 amendments, the history of the legislation indicated that there "are
modifications which can and should be made in these programs--changes which
. . . show great promise for making significant advances in accomplishing the
goal of making these programs more economical and more capable of carrying
out their original purposes.178 Participation by the states in the Medicaid pro-
gram has always been voluntary. 70
In the context of the instant discussion, the first question which presents itself
is whether the abortion procedure is covered by the Medicaid statute and,
secondly, if so, to what extent? Judging by the results of a survey conducted
by the Law Review, the answer to the initial problem is unclear.80
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(e) (repealed 1972); see 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(9) (1972); 1965
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1943, 1950. One early observer of the Medicaid statute said
the program "aim[ed] toward full and comprehensive coverage for all the medically tndl-
gent;" and, "what the new program really brings is a complete system of tax-supported
health care for all the needy operated by the states and largely subsidized by the Federal
Government." N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1966, § 1, at 70, col. 2.
75. Act of Jul. 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 350.
76. Act of Aug. 9, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-56, § 2(a), 83 Stat. 99.
77. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. II, § 230, 86 Stat. 1410.
78. 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4989, 4994 (emphasis added). See also Id. at 4086;
1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1078 (report on two-year suspension of full coverage
deadline), where Congress reasserted its dedication to the original goal that: "all persons
who meet the State's test of need, whose own resources, and the resources available to them
... are insufficient, will receive the medical care which they need . . . ." Id. at 1081 (quot-
ing from the Senate report on the original bill).
79. 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2014.
80. The textual discussion which follows seeks to ascertain whether an abortion pro-
cedure falls within the Medicaid coverage. An alternative argument for such coverage Is
also available if one considers abortions as the ultimate form of contraception. See Com-
ment, 49 N.C.L. Rev. 487, 499 (1971). The second line of attack follows from one of the
1972 amendments to the Medicaid legislation, mandating that if a state participates in a
Medicaid program, it must provide qualified indigents with family planning services and
supplies if they request them. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. II, § 299E(b),
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B. The Statute's Breadth
1. Minimal Mandated Participation
The scheme of the federal Medicaid statute is a fairly complicated one,
but it should suffice for the purposes of the discussion to highlight a few
features.
If a state chooses to participate in a Medicaid program, it must8 1 provide
five basic services to indigents falling within four classes of categorical re-
cipients: families with dependent children, and aged, disabled or blind indi-
viduals.82 The five categories of mandatory participation are: inpatient
hospital services (other than for tuberculosis or mental disease); outpatient
hospital services; laboratory and X-ray services; physicians' services; and
nursing home care for certain individuals, preventive screening and diagnostic
services for children and family planning materials for those requesting them.P
Arguably, depending on the facts, abortions may be covered under the first
two categories. But, it is submitted, in the overwhelming percentage of cases,
86 Stat. 1462, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (4) (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)
(4) (C) (Supp. 1973)). For the purposes of the Medicaid provisions, family planning services
have been defined as "including drugs, supplies, and devices, when such services are under
the supervision of a physician." 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(b) (15) (ii) (1972). By negative inference
from the use of the word "including," the list is not exhaustive and may include abortions.
By contrast, when the Congress passed the Family Planning Services and Research Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a to a-6 (1970), providing funds to states which opted to participate
by creating comprehensive programs of family planning services, the lawmakers specifically
excluded abortion as a means of family planning to be recognized under the act. 42 US.C.
§ 300a-6 (1970); see 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5068, 5070, 5078, 5081-82. How-
ever, managers of the bill in the House of Representatives stated that the legislation was
"not intended to interfere with or limit programs conducted in accordance with State or
local laws and regulations which are supported by funds other than those authorized under
this legislation:' 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5082. And in the 1972 Medicaid anend-
ments, no such negativing language appears to have been attached to the family planning
mandate.
In the wake of the Wade and Bolton decisions, the Law Review mailed letters to the 50
attorneys general, asking if their states were Medicaid participants, whether the plans were
providing for or would cover abortions of the indigent. Of the 23 responding states with
Medicaid provisions, 39.1 percent said they considered abortions within the coverage, while
another 17.4 percent said they would only cover medically indicated abortions. Another
34.8 percent said they were uncertain as to whether Medicaid benefits should be extended
to abortion patients, and 8.7 percent said they would not cover abortions. Arizona responded,
but does not participate in Medicaid.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(13) (B) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a) (1) (1972); 1965 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 1943, 2017.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(13) (B) (1970) ; see Dimery v. Department of Social Servs., 344 F.
Supp. 1181, 1183 (S.D. Iowa 1972); 1967 U.. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2834, 2866-67, 3025;
1965 US. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2020-21, 2246. Medicaid benefits to Aid to Families with
Dependent Children recipients were altered by the 1972 amendments. See 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4989, 5060-61, 5379-80. For a discussion of the changes in the AFDC
plan designed to remove work disincentives see id. at 5144-82.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(1)-(3) (1970); 42 US.C. § 1396d(a)(4)-(5) (Supp. 1973).
1973]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the critical category for the purposes of the instant discussion is that of
"physicians' services." The statute stipulates that such shall be covered
"whether furnished in the office, the patient's home, a hospital, or a skilled
nursing facility, or elsewhere."'8 The statute broadly defines "physician," to
include "doctor[s] of medicine or osteopathy legally authorized to practice
medicine or surgery by the state."8 5 Moreover, the regulations issued pursuant
to the legislation86 qualify the definition only to the extent that they stipulate
physicians' services are those "provided, within the scope of practice of his
profession as defined by State law, by or under the personal supervision of an
individual licensed under State law to practice medicine or osteopathy. '87 In
Wade, the Court stated that the woman and her physicians must be free, at
least during the first trimester, to decide to terminate pregnancy.88 During that
time period, the Court said the only regulation that a state might impose was
that the "physician" be "currently licensed by the State. '8 D Consequently, in
the post-Wade context, the services of an aborting physician, if licensed by the
state, would appear to fall squarely within the bounds of Medicaid coverage.90
2. Optional Coverage of Medical Indigents
As a practical matter, however, a great number of women seeking abortions
at state (Medicaid) expense may well be unable to qualify for one of the four
84. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a) (5) (Supp. 1973).
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(r)(1) (Supp. 1973); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(5) (Supp.
1973).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) (general authorization to issue rules and regulations for entire
Social Security Act).
87. 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(b)(5) (1972).
88. 93 S. Ct. at 732.
89. Id. at 732-33.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(1o) (A) (i) (1970) mandates that if a state participates in the
Medicaid program, it must make medical assistance equally available to all categorical groups.
See 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1943, 2017. Therefore, one might argue that since
the aged will not use Medicaid funds for abortions (because it is more than improbable that
a qualified aged person would conceive and thereby raise the possibility of desiring an
abortion), such funds should be denied to those in the other categorical groups seeking abor-
tions. The argument misses the point. The statute requires that Medicaid funds be made
available equally. Thus, it is sufficient that, should an elderly person ever desire an abortion,
the funds be made available to that person, as they may have been in the past to those
qualifying from the other three categories.
It might be argued that since only medically indicated abortions were legal (and then
in only about half the country's jurisdictions) at the time of the initial Medicaid legislation
(see statutes collected in Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. at 720 nn.34-37), Congress did not intend
that such procedures be incorporated within the meaning of "physicians' services." However,
that argument pales in the light of four factors. First, the original and continuing congres-
sional intent was to provide broad medical care to the poor. Second, Congress has not
specifically excluded abortions from Medicaid coverage. Third, the legislature has specifically
excepted them from the federally funded Family Planning Services and Research Act. See
note 80 supra. And finally, even during the time when Title XIX was initially considered,




categorical classes. At the same time, these individuals may be unable to pay
for the abortion themselves or to pay for third-party coverage. That is, they
may be "medically indigent." 91 A state may92 choose to enroll this latter group
in its Medicaid program. However, it must first opt for the mandatory coverage
of the four categorical classesO3 Thereafter, the state may provide the medical
indigents with either at least the five basic classifications of assistance or seven
of a longer list.P Thus, if the medically indigent are included in a particular
state's program, they should be able to obtain an abortion even if they are
without means, provided the state's program includes the "physicians' services"
category or one of a few other broad classifications of aid.03 On the other hand,
if the state does not choose to include the medically indigent in its program, or
it so tailors the medically indigent plan so as to avoid one of the broad classifi-
cations, the medically indigent may be left without a means to satisfy the right
of the decision to abort.
C. State "Tampering" with Medicaid Coverage
1. Eliminating Abortion Reimbursement
Assuming that a state has a Medicaid program, the next issue for resolution
is whether the state plan may be so drafted as to exclude specifically coverage
of abortions. The answer, it is submitted, is in the negative for both statutory
and constitutional reasons.
First, courts have interpreted the Medicaid legislation correctly as voluntary
to the states.9 6 However, they have said that once a state participates in the
program, it must comply with federal statutes and regulations to remain eli-
gible.9 7 Thus, if the federal statutes mandate coverage of abortions under the
"physicians' services" category as contended herein. 8 then a state plan may
91. It should be noted that since the Wade and Bolton decisions the Internal Revenue
Service has ruled that the cost of abortion is a legitimate medical e.xpense deduction. Rev.
Rul. 73-201, 1973 Int. Rev. Bull No. 15, at 24. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1973, at 52,
cols. 5-6. For another definition of "medical indigency" see Fullington v. Shea, 320 F. Supp.
500 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 963 (1971), where the court describes the members
of the group as "those who but for 'excessive income' (income or resources exceed[ing]
state-set income levels for public assistance) would fit within one of the [categorical groups]."
Id. at 503.
92. Id. at 504-05, construing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10) (B) (1970).
93. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(13)(C) (Supp. 1973); see 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2834, 3136.
95. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(6) (1970): "medical care, or any other type of
remedial care recognized under State law, furnished by licensed practitioners within the
scope of their practice as defined by State law;" 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(9) (1970): "clinic
services." See also note 80 supra for the argument that abortions are covered by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a) (4) (C) (Supp. 1973), one of the five classes of assistance that are mandatory if
a state does not elect to choose seven of the 14 categories.
96. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
97. Schaak v. Schmidt, 344 F. Supp. 99, 103 (E.D. Wis. 1971); WXrlczynski v. Harder, 323
F. Supp. 509, 511 n.1 (D. Conn. 1971).
98. See notes 83-90 supra and accompanying text.
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not excise specifically that coverage lest the state lose its eligibility for
further federal assistance under the statute.
Even absent these interpretations of the statute, however, in a post-Wade
context, it is urged that a state might not write out abortions from its Medicaid
plan. The basis for this contention is the Court's language in Wade that, during
the first trimester, "the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is
free to determine, without regulation by the State, that in his medical judgment
the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the
judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free ol interference by the State."'9
State plans for the four categorical groups of indigents clearly cover obstetrical
care of the pregnant woman. It has been contended that they should also
cover the aborting physicians' services.1' In a post-Wade situation, once hav-
ing decided with her physician to terminate a pregnancy, the only thing that
might prevent the indigent woman from aborting the fetus would be a lack of
funds. Absent a specific exclusion for abortions, however, the Medicaid-covered
indigent could effectuate the abortion decision. If the state should specifically
except the abortion procedure from its Medicaid reimbursement plan, it inter-
feres in the effectuation process, creating a monetary hurdle by its negative
action. While this interference is not that positive kind of interference typical
of the traditional restrictive abortion laws which the Court in Wade invali-
dated, it is nevertheless interference with a constitutionally recognized right
which is forbidden by Wade.
2. Discriminating on the Need for an Abortion
A further problem consists in whether a state legislature (or the department
administering a state Medicaid program) may refine the coverage it will extend
to abortions under Medicaid plans, permitting reimbursement for "medically
indicated" abortions, while denying it for "elective" procedures.10' The short
99. 93 S. Ct. at 732 (emphasis added).
100. Notes 83-90 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps the example of third-party
payers of medical care, notably Blue Cross/Blue Shield, at least in New York, is instructive.
Since New York's liberalized abortion law has been in effect, the companies have provided
the same indemnity allowance for an abortion as they provide for a normal obstetrical
delivery. The amounts paid depend on the policy held by the pregnant woman. See letters
from Edwin R. Werner, vice president, to subscribers of Blue Cross/Blue Shield, July 27,
1970. For a post-Wade case restraining Connecticut officials from refusing to reimburse
hospitals for abortions with Medicaid funds see Poe v. Norton, Civil No. 15,712 (D. Conn.,
filed Apr. 4, 1973). The order was "clarified" and apparently limited to "medically indi-
cated" abortions, Poe v. Norton, Civil No. 15,712 (D. Conn., filed Apr. 17, 1973), although
the court stated that standards for determining what is medically indicated was "not at
issue in this lawsuit." Id. at 2.
101. "Medically indicated" abortions are those where the examining physician determines
that it is an advisable procedure to preserve the life or health of the woman. "Elective"
abortions are those which the pregnant woman seeks because, for any other reason, she
does not desire to bear the child. City of New York v. Wyman, 37 App. Div. 2d 700, 322
N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (1st Dep't 1971) (dissenting opinion), rev'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281
N.E.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972).
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answer is that the analysis applicable to the last discussion pertains here too;
that is, that the state may not on its own initiative exclude from coverage
physicians' services which appear to be included under the federal formula.
However, since two litigations in New York, reaching opposite conclusions, 102
have raised this question, the subject merits additional consideration.
a. Statutory Analysis
In the first place, the federal statute and the regulations thereunder indicate
that such discrimination is violative of the enabling legislation. The statute re-
quires that medical assistance be made equally available to all those within
the four categorical classes. 103 If medical indigents are covered by state plans,
the statute mandates they too shall be accorded an equal availability of medical
care'0 (though not necessarily coextensive with that open to the categorical
needy) 105 The law does not admit to subdivisions of medical care.100 From the
physician's standpoint, an elective abortion procedure is as much a physician's
service as a medically indicated abortion.
These requirements of the federal statute conform to the traditional concept
of the Constitution's dictate of equal protection of the laws; viz., that "those
102. Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), appeal
filed sub nom. Ryan v. Klein, 41 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1972) (No. 745) (invalidat-
ing a directive which distinguished between "elective" and "medically indicated" abortions);
City of New York v. Wyman, 66 Misc. 2d 402, 321 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct.), afPd mem.,
37 App. Div. 2d 700, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1st Dep't 1971), rev'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281
N.E2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972) (upholding the same directive).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10) (A) i) (1970). The regulations in this area merely reinforce
the statute. See 45 C.F.. §§ 249.10(a) (6), (7) (1972).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(B)(ii) (1970); see 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(7) (1972).
105. Recall the medical assistance provided the medically indigent may be either at least
the five basic categories or seven of the 14. It is conceivable that a state plan might provide
the categorical needy with the five basic categories and the medically indigent with seven
different classifications of assistance.
106. It has been urged elsewhere that language of 42 US.C. § 1396 (1970) supports the
elective-medically indicated distinction. Jurisdictional statement of appellant at 14-15, Ryan
v. Klein, 41 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. appeal fied Nov. 20, 1972) (No. 745). The statute does
not say Medicaid funds are to be used only to furnish necessary medical services; it says
funds may be appropriated to furnish medical assistance for categorical recipients whose
income is insufficient to meet the costs of necessary and medical services. If the poor cannot
afford necessary medical care, they obviously cannot afford "elective" services. But that
to which they are entitled is medical assistance as defined by 42 U.S.CA. § 1396d (Supp.
1973), and that section does not make the "necessary medical services" distinction in the five
basic classifications of medical care. Consequently, on the face of the statute, at least, per-
sons within the four groups of categorical recipients could well be entitled to Medicaid
coverage of elective surgery, even including plastic surgery. However, as a practical matter,
it would be rare for these needy persons to seek such surgery. Moreover, the case for elective
abortions is distinguishable from that of elective plastic surgery, especially in the light of
the Court's recognition of the extenuating circumstances attending the forced birth of an
unwanted child. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
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who are similarly situated be similarly treated." 07 The legitimacy of the state's
attempt to subdivide potential abortion patients into "elective" and "medically
indicated" classifications, therefore, must be determined by juxtaposition to
the equal protection clause.
b. Equal Protection Analysis: The Tests
The courts have traditionally determined equal protection problems by a
bifurcated test.108 If the classification is based on a "suspect" classificatory trait,100
or if the classification infringes upon a fundamental interest,1' 0 so-called
"active review" or "strict scrutiny" will be applied and the statute or regula-
tion upheld only if a state can show a "compelling state interest.""' Absent
such criteria, the courts require only a reasonable relationship between the
classification and the purpose of the law. The test has been stated classically
in this manner:
A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law.
The purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a public "mischief" or the
achievement of some positive public good.112
More recently, Professor Gunther has formulated a third test which takes an
intermediate approach; i.e., "that legislative means must substantially further
legislative ends." 113 And finally, another writer has proposed a second inter-
mediate approach, whereby the Court would balance the legislative interests in
the asserted classification against the "harsh negative impact that deprivation
of some non-constitutional rights and interests can have." 14
107. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 344
(1949) [hereinafter cited as Tussman & tenBroek].
108. See generally Gunther; Tussman & tenBroek; Comment, Equal Protection In Tran-
sition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 605 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Equal Protection in Transition]; Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protec-
tion, 82 Yale L.J. 123 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Purpose].
109. See cases cited in Legislative Purpose 123 n.4.
110. See cases collected in Legislative Purpose 123 n.3. The Court has now determined
that for equal protection purposes a right is "fundamental" only if "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278,
1297 (1973).
111. See Equal Protection in Transition 610-11 discussing the nature of the burden this
test places on the state and concluding: "To date, application of the strict review standard
has in every case resulted in a finding of unconstitutionality." Id. at 611.
112. Tussman & tenBroek 346.
113. Gunther 20. The author sees his test as a way of having the courts "assess the means
in terms of legislative purposes that have subtantial basis in actuality, not merely in con-
jecture," and of avoiding an adjudication "on the basis of fundamental interests with shaky
constitutional roots." Id. at 21. See also Equal Protection in Transition 633-37 for a critique
of Gunther's formulation, especially at 634 indicating the key word in Gunther's model,
"means," is capable of two definitions.
114. Equal Protection in Transition 631. In the Rodriguez case, the Court dealt this view
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How, then, would a state's excepting elective abortions from Medicaid
coverage fare against these alternative approaches? Before proceeding, an ex-
amination of the manner in which the two New York litigations treated the
problem may be instructive.
c. The New York Cases
The first case to present the issue was City of New York v. Wyman.n0 Dur-
ing the first nine months of the state's liberalized abortion law's effectiveness,
Medicaid covered all abortions for qualified indigents. In April of 1971, how-
ever, State Commissioner of Social Services George Wyman issued a directive
ordering the distinction between "elective" and "medically indicated" abortions
be observed in considering all future requests for Medicaid abortion fundsUn
The City of New York, joined by several indigent intervenors, sued in state
court to have the directive annulled. The trial court found for the city, con-
cluding:
The directive must be condemned when it deprives some indigents of rights which
all others enjoy. It is even less tolerable when it deprives some indigents of the rights
which other indigents enjoy.11 7
In reaching this result, the court relied largely on three lines of argument.2 8
First, the state was not obligated to provide medical services to the poor, but
once it commenced conferring the benefit, it had to bestow it equally, lest the
state be guilty of denying an indigent woman her right to terminate her
pregnancy1 1 9 Second, in liberalizing its abortion statute, the legislature "ex-
a serious blow-at least for the time being--in renouncing "comparisons of the relative
societal significance" as a method of determining "fundamental" rights. 93 S. Ct. at 1297.
115. 66 Misc. 2d 402, 321 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 37 App. Div. 2d 700, 322
N.Y.S.2d 957 (1st Dep't 1971), rev'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d
385 (1972).
116. 66 Misc. 2d at 403, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 696-97.
117. Id. at 422, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
118. The court also found, in passing, that elective abortions were within the statutory
coverage. Id. at 421, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 714. But see text at notes 125-28 infra. Finally, the
court further held that the directive was defective in that it constituted a change in the
state's plan and had not been first approved by the federal government. Discussion of this
phase of the case is limited to noting that the applicable section of the federal statute re-
quiring prior approval for proposed changes in Medicaid coverage was repealed in 1972.
Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. I1, § 231, 86 Stat. 1410. The section was
deleted as part of the suspension of the deadline for full medical care for the needy. See
notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text. See also 1972 US. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 5086-87, 5302.
119. 66 Misc. 2d at 411-15, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 705-08. The court relied on Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) among other
cases, in a discussion concluding that the state had failed to show a compelling state interest
in the distinction made by the directive. 66 Misc. 2d at 417-18, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 710-11. For
a parallel discussion see notes 33-54 supra and accompanying text.
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pressed public policy"'120 and made it "clear that the State was embarking on a
policy it deemed beneficial to indigent women confronted by an unwanted
pregnancy.' 121 In this light, the directive was viewed as "regressive" and
"tend[ing] to defeat the objective" of the legislation.122 Third, the federal "law
mandate[d] that an indigent is entitled to physician services for medical assis-
tance."
1 23
The appellate division affirmed by a three-to-one margin, but disavowed the
constitutional argument. 124 Justice Steuer dissented in an essentially semantic
argument, urging that elective abortions do not fall within the meaning of the
state statute. 125 The law called for medical assistance to qualified indigents
where "necessary to prevent, diagnose, correct or cure conditions . . . that
cause acute suffering, endanger life, result in illness or infirmity, interfere with
his capacity for normal activity, or threaten some significant handicap .... 120
In vivid language, the judge stated: "Pregnancy is not an abnormal condition,
and abortion is not a cure any more than decapitation is a cure for a head-
ache."127
In a memorandum decision adopting Justice Steuer's opinion, the court of
appeals reversed by a four-to-three vote.128 The dissenters urged affirmance,
emphasizing the argument that the legislative history of the abortion law
liberalization underscored a policy determination to make abortions available to
the indigent. 129
120. 66 Misc. 2d at 421, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
121. Id. at 417, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
122. Id. at 420, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
123. Id. at 421, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
124. 37 App. Div. 2d 700, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (1st Dep't 1971), rev'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d
537, 281 N.E.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972).
125. 37 App. Div. 2d at 700-01, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 958-60 (Steucr, J., dissenting).
126. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 365-a(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972-73).
127. 37 App. Div. 2d at 701, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 959-60 (Steuer, J., dissenting). By calling
the directive an interpretation, rather than a reduction in the class of eligibles, Justice Steuer
distinguished the directive from other situations in which, under the then existing law, ap-
proval from the federal government would have been needed. Id. at 701, 322 N.Y.S.2d at
959. He dismissed the policy argument by saying that if the legislature found its intent (in
liberalizing the abortion law) subverted by his opinion, it could amend the Social Welfare
Law so as to cover specifically elective abortions. Id., 322 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
128. 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972).
129. Id. at 538-41, 281 N.E.2d at 181-83, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 386-89. It is interesting to note
that with the exception of the trial court's passing reference, none of the opinions in the
state court litigation noticed the requirement that if states participate in the Medicaid pro-
gram, their laws must conform to the federal statute and regulations. See note 97 supra and
accompanying text. In the same regard, the opinion of Justice Cardozo in an early case in-
terpreting the Social Security Act (of which the Medicaid statute is Title XIX) bears repeti-
tion: "The issue is a closed one. It was fought out long ago. When money is spent to
promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress,
not the states. So the concept be not arbitrary, the locality must yield." Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937) (footnote omitted). Had the courts in New York paid greater heed
to this dictate, they would have reached a contrary result and obviated the semantic battle.
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Less than seven months after the court of appeals resolved the Wyman
case, however, the validity of the same directive was litigated in Klein v.
Nassau County Medical Center.130 There, a three-judge federal district court
held that the statute and the directive, "if interpreted as mandating the Com-
missioner's directive,13 ' would deny indigent women the equal protection of
the laws to which they are constitutionally entitled."' 132 The court's reasoning
is noteworthy for its recognition of the two-fold nature of the classification;
i.e., one based on both poverty and "behavioral choice" (namely, the election
to abort the fetus rather than go to term with the pregnancy). Pointing out
that the woman would be accorded Medicaid funds but for (a) her choice not
to go to term, and (b) her failure to fit into a "medically indicated" cate-
gory,133 the court stated: "No interest of the State is served by the arbitrary
discrimination ... .,134 The court's conclusion was based on the absence of a
state fiscal interest' 35 in excluding elective abortions from Medicaid coverage and
on a finding that a purported legislative interest in discouraging justifiable
abortional acts may not be advanced by singling out the poor for the dis-
couragement.' 36 While the latter statement may have been debatable when
Klein was decided, it now seems to have been prophetic, for Wade indicates
that the state has no legitimate interest, at least during the first trimester, in
discouraging abortions. 13
d. Equal Protection: Application
From this brief discussion, one sees that the two reported cases dealing with
the attempt to exclude elective abortions from Medicaid coverage have been
notable, if for nothing else, for their inconsistency of approach. Returning then
to the question at hand, how should a court faced with such an attempt meet
the subject?
Finally, it is also of interest that the compiled rules and regulations of New York relative
to its Medicaid plan, and in particular the subsection under "physicians' services," make no
distinction between elective and medically indicated abortion. 18 N.Y.C.-R. § 505.2(e)
(1971).
130. 347 F. Supp. 496 (EJD.N.Y. 1972), appeal filed sub nom. Ryan v. Klein, 41 US.L.W.
3367 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1972) (No. 745).
131. Earlier in the opinion, the court allowed that the Wyman case might be interpreted
as holding that the Commissioner's directive was simply consistent with the state statute,
rather than required by it. 347 F. Supp. at 500.
132. Id. (footnote added).
133. The state Medicaid plan covered medically indicated abortions and obstetrical care.
Id. at 499; 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 505.2(d), (e) (1971).
134. 347 F. Supp. at 500 (emphasis added).
135. The trial court in the Wyman case exposed the arithmetic of the problem. Outpatient
abortions cost an average $64, while inpatient operations averaged $177. By comparison,
average medical costs associated with prenatal care and delivery of a child ran to $S0.
AFDC payments were calculated to cost $624 a year. 66 Misc. 2d at 407-08, 321 N.YS.2d
at 701.
136. 347 F. Supp. at 501.
137. See 93 S. Ct. at 732; text accompanying note 99 supra.
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Aside from the statutory approach discussed above,18  the answer depends on
the equal protection test applied18 9 and that in turn rests on the perspective in
which one places the case.140 If one accepts the minority view that poverty is
a suspect classification, 41 that determination would trigger active review. Al-
ternatively, if one deems as dispositive the inclusion of the abortion right as
part of the fundamental personal privacy right, then that posture too would
trigger strict scrutiny142 and, most likely, the state would lose.148 If on the
other hand, one views the question as one solely of "economics and social wel-
fare,"'144 then, following the lead of the Supreme Court,145 the traditional,
rational basis test would be the appropriate test vehicle. Even in this posture,
however, the result reached by the Klein court would be proper, for the state
may assert no justifiable interest in slicing off so small a piece of the Medicaid
pie.' 46 Denying an abortion to an indigent-a physician's service usually cost-
ing less than $15014 7 -may result in the state's paying thousands of dollars to
support a dependent child until his majority. Thus, the classification does not
advance a fiscal interest. Asserting an interest in discouraging abortions, even
in states without an expressed public policy such as was found in New York's
legislative history, 48 would seem a direct contravention of the Wade dictate
138. See text accompanying notes 103-06 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 107-14 supra.
140. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. at 1289 (mandating that
"threshold questions" be resolved before application of an equal protection test).
141. The Rodriguez Court asserted that the Supreme Court had never held that wealth
discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny. 93 S. Ct. at
1294. Rather, the onus of prior cases in which impecunious petitioners succeeded with equal
protection claims was two-fold: (1) they were completely unable to pay for some desired
benefit and, consequently, (2) they were absolutely deprived of the opportunity to enjoy
the benefit. Id. at 1290. Justice Douglas seems to be the prime advocate of invoking strict
scrutiny where wealth (poverty) is the basis of the classification. See, e.g., Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371, 386 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
142. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
143. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
144. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970). The Court in the Rodriguez case ultimately employed the rational basis
test, as well. 93 S. Ct. at 1300. Justice Marshall dissented vehemently in each of the
three cases. See 93 S. Ct. at 1330; 406 U.S. at 574-76; 397 U.S. at 519-21 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
145. See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970).
146. For examples of where the state has been found to meet the rational basis test
in the area of Medicaid regulation see, Dimery v. Department of Social Servs., 344 F. Supp.
1181 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509, 519-21 (D. Conn. 1971).
147. While the Wyman court placed the average cost of an inpatient abortion at $177,
see note 135 supra, recently, competition in New York has forced the price of an abortion
downward. Interview with Ira Neiger, Director of Public Information, Planned Parenthood
of New York City, Inc., Mar. 23, 1973.
148. See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
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that women be free to choose an abortion.1 49 When these last two factors are
placed into the Gunther-test 5 0 hopper, a similar finding of invalidity results.
Finally, were one to make use of the second intermediate approach to equal
protection,' 51 the end product would be the same, but the balance would be
tipped even farther toward invalidity by the factors evincing potentially harsh
impact. 52 Thus, no matter which equal protection test is used,'1 3 such a dis-
tinction among pregnant indigents eligible for Medicaid benefits must fail as
violative of the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in its recent decisions of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bol-
ton has determined that a woman, in consultation with her physician, must be
free to choose to terminate her pregnancy, at least during her first trimester.
The Court based its conclusion on a right, difficult of precise articulation, which
it stated was "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action."'15 Absent a precedent-shattering
Court ruling according indigents a corollary right to implementation of the
abortion right, no constitutional argument by which indigents might win free
abortions appears persuasive. However, if a state participates in the federal
Medicaid program, abortions should be included in that coverage-at least
abortions performed during the first trimester on members of the four basic
categorical groups. The medically indigent 7nay recieve Medicaid benefits for
abortions, depending on the extent of the coverage afforded them by the par-
ticular state plan 55 Once a state adopts a Medicaid plan, it may not dis-
criminate as to the types of abortions which will be covered during the first
trimester. A state may, of course, rescind its Medicaid enabling legislation, for
the program is entirely voluntary. But such a course of action would seem a
drastic overreaction, working a severe disservice to otherwise qualified indigents.
Finally, it is conceivable that Congress might specifically exempt elective abor-
tions from coverage under the Medicaid statute, just as it excluded abortions
149. 93 S. Ct. at 732; see text accompanying note 99 supra. Thus, the purpose of the law
neither achieves some public good nor eliminates a legitimate public "mischief.Y See text
accompanying note 112 supra.
150. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
152. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
153. For at least the time being, the Court has declined to recognize either of the two
suggested intermediate approaches to the equal protection problem, and, instead, has opted
for the traditional two-tiered system. See 93 S. Ct. at 1330 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
155. See notes 91-95 supra and accompanying text. If the abortion is to be performed
on an otherwise unqualified needy person in a facility receiving federal funds for hospital
construction or modernization, the procedure may be covered by regulations requiring such
institutions to provide "a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay." 42 CJ'.R.




from the federal Family Planning Services and Research Act. 50 However, such
an amendment of the federal law would contravene the spirit of the initial
Medicaid enactment-that full medical care be extended to as many needy
people as fiscally possible. Moreover, by eliminating federal support for all
classes of abortion, the Congress would impose extreme hardships on those
indigent women who seek to terminate pregnancies for medical reasons. Were
the Congress to delimit the abortions permissible under Medicaid to those that
are medically indicated, the arguments urged against a state taking such action
would apply.
Thus, in the wake of the Wade and Bolton decisions (and absent recognition
of a corollary right to implement the primary right), the right to an abortion
is limited. Many poor women seeking abortions remain outside the scope of
Medicaid and other medical care coverages. This group includes all those people
in the four basic categorical classes in states that have not elected Medicaid
participation, and medical indigents in participating states with only limited
coverage. For these people, the potential negative impact resulting from an
inability to procure an abortion may be tremendous. The horror tales of back-
alley abortionists are legion and need not be repeated here. Consequently, al-
though legislators may have personal moral convictions against abortion, it is
urged that those legislators should not foreclose the availability of abortions to
the indigent who may have equally strong convictions on the other side. Legis-
lation is needed which would afford poor pregnant women outside the scope of
traditional Medicaid coverage the chance to effectuate the right accorded them
by the Wade and Bolton decisions.157 Such an act would not in and of itself
encourage abortions, but it would permit indigent women the necessary free-
dom to make the choice which the Supreme Court has stated is a function of
the woman's fundamental right to personal privacy.
156. See note 80 supra.
157. Dr. John H. Knowles, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, similarly has urged
that government agencies and the private health sector share the responsibility of making
safe and humane abortions available to women throughout the country regardless of their
ability to pay. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1973, at 31, cols. 2-4.
